

ERRATA.

Table No. 1 being misprinted, it will suffice to say that 1,560,000 acres are required for four quotas of Militia Staff, as will be seen by Table No. 4.

On 1st page, 5th paragraph, for "primeal" read "primeval."

On 7th page, 6th paragraph, for "Staff hold" read "Staff should hold"

CANADA,

Defended by Her Militia.

THE only enemies Canada has to wait for as invaders are the United States, and that we shall not be long without such a visit is as certain as that they, if we be true to ourselves, will be driven back, as they invariably have been, and which history attests.

If the existing internecine war of that country be followed by a foreign one, judging from the past, Canada will be its object.

In 1775 Arnold and Montgomery invaded our country.

In 1812, although the obnoxious Orders in Council, the avowed reason of American dissatisfaction, were repealed, still the American Government, coveting Canada, declared war against England and invaded the Province at a time when England's struggle was one for existence, unable to afford Canada neither money nor men. (*)

And in 1837, during our domestic troubles, the American Government grossly connived at the assistance given to the disaffected by their sympathising filibusters, by allowing their frontier armouries to be plundered by them and used against the loyal portion of our people.

If Canada so long back was worth contending for, when its principal feature was one vast primeval forest, how much more so now, when so large a portion of its wilderness has been converted into valuable field-bearing cereals, with good roads to convey their proceeds to markets, that have cost us thousands on thousands of dollars to construct; when its hidden treasures of auriferous beds, valuable deposits of iron, lead, copper and antimony are being discovered, with railways that have cost millions of dollars, securing a cheap and ready transit to the best markets; and when

(*) A great debt of gratitude is due by our country to that eminent jurist and statesman, the late Chief Justice Sewell, whose system of finance raised the millions necessary for the war of 1812.

its forest, though curtailed in its expanse, still continues to be a lucrative source for commercial enterprise, with safe and costly canals, slides and lights, to facilitate this great present staple of our commerce.

I repeat, if Canada in 1775 and 1812 was worth fighting for, without these several great advantages, how much more so now.

Since the day of Arnold's invasion our population has increased from thousands to millions, and our wealth and power proportional, and so has the avidity with which the American Government contemplates the hoped for conquest of Canada. Its acquisition would give them 3,000,000 consumers of the Northern manufactories, and rate-payers for their enormous national debt, and with our 20 millions acres of wild land, their visible wealth in timber, and unknown amount of mineral treasure. They would acquire the free use of the St. Lawrence, a commercial necessity to the vast agricultural products of the Western States, and the shorterst and most practical route to the Pacific—thus augmenting the power of the Northern States by sea and land; for I contend the possession of Canada by the United States involves the acquisition of the whole of British America by the American Republic. The Newfoundland and St. Lawrence fisheries will become the nurseries for their seamen—from the Banks and Gulf they will exclude the powers of Europe—and their commercial navy, so augmented by these fisheries, coupled with a most extensive coasting trade, they will become equal to any European maritime power, and as they extend their borders and augment their powers they will in the same ratio diminish that of England, for the inevitable consequence of the loss of Canada is that of British America, with a loss of prestige in Europe that would soon be followed by an armed European confederation against her.

When we consider the former invasions of Canada, then comparatively unknown, laying in the shade of her wilderness, but now surging to the surface-level of nations, and estimating her present value as such, politically and commercially, from this point of view, if the past and present may not justify a decided belief in an invasion from the United States, it certainly warrants our being prepared for such an eventuality.

Is our present Militia organization such as to give us a reasonable hope of successful resistance to the next and third onslaught on our homes by the American Republic? If I were to answer in the affirmative, not a man in Canada would concur in my reply.

On the contrary, it is the general impression, unreservedly and loudly expressed, that the absence of everything like an efficient Militia Act invites aggression, leaving us, in that event, without hope to the tender mercies of the invader. But this is not all we have to deplore; why has that so important measure to our defence, the Intercolonial Railway, been abandoned? by which, for five months of the year, we must draw from our sea-base all British reinforcements and munitions of war, should the scourge of battles

visit our borders. And again, why is it that we are so indifferent to the consolidation of the Provinces under one Government, that would so augment our means of resistance, increasing our wealth by extending our commercial transactions, elevating British America to a much higher status than that which her present disjointed condition confers on her? This union by law and railway is more necessary now than ever; by these means we may obtain a position of defence that would deter the hostility of our neighbors, whose dear-bought experience against the South will have taught them that a people cherishing independence cannot easily be overcome, and although the present American contest has called into existence most formidable armies, well appointed, inured to the hardships of war, and disciplined by experience in the field, they would not hazard a war with England if British America could arm five hundred thousand men to defend her soil. That she can do this, and that the integrity of the Empire demand it, does not admit of a doubt; the mere evidence of our ability to make such a demonstration of military power would avert the march of an hostile American army from our frontiers. But if we continue in our present helpless condition, the temptation to possess Canada, and finally British America, may be too great for the North American Republic to resist, and we may be invaded by a most overwhelming force, whose line of march would be traced by conflagration, blood and rapine, our cities ruthlessly bombarded, our sons, for want of proper organization and discipline, helplessly bearing the brunt of war without hope. All this may come on us, and its danger is imminent so long as we have a mere paper force, not worth the paper on which its existence is recorded.

FINANCE.

As figures, correctly calculated, cannot deceive, I submit the Tables marked No. 1, 2, 3 and 4. From these it will be seen that every four years 3,340 men will be called out for Lower Canada, formed into 80 companies, and incorporated into eight battalions. These tables comprise all that I can say on this most important part of the Militia question.

Having given my reasons why a war with the United States is a probable event, and the necessity for a more efficient Militia Act than the present one, I come to the consideration of the amendment of that Act.

The present armament of the United States renders the consideration of our Militia Act a matter of paramount importance. Its existing provisions affords no effectual power of resistance to such a force as the American Republic could now assail us with. [It must be admitted it is a question beset with perplexities, difficult to solve.

We have 30,000 men to incorporate for defence, but what Canada lacks is the sinews of war—money; and this great want I propose to provide for, so far as to place the country under so perfect a military organization that England's gold, in the event of her having a war with the States, could

In an incredible short time form an efficient army of 300,000 Canadians. We cannot sustain a standing army of even 10,000 men, and if we could of what avail would they be against 400,000? We cannot call out 50,000 men to drill for 20 days, for the direct cost of their pay and the indirect loss consequent on the abstraction of their labor from the rural sections would cost the Province 1,055,000 of dollars per annum, as per Table No. 5.

Now, to place Canada in an attitude of security, in the event of a third effort on the part of the American Republic to conquer her; and reasons of State, apart from the Monroe doctrine, as has been shewn, are not wanting to justify the American Government to make the attempt.

We therefore should, in my humble opinion, adopt the English principle of Militia that obtained in the United Kingdom for years after the peace of 1815. That consisted of a Militia Staff, the principles of which being adapted to the peculiar circumstances of Canada, I submit for consideration; for as it appears to me it would enable us to organize the masses of the Active and Sedentary Militia in the shortest time possible, and is the only means of bringing our whole force rapidly to the front in the most efficient form, in the limited time an enemy from the States would allow us. Hence it is indispensable that the Canada Militia Act should contain the following provisions:

The Governor General should be authorised, by and with the advice of the Executive Council, to call out, whenever it may be deemed expedient, not less than four nor more than eight out of every 100 of Active Service Men of Militia, by ballot, if volunteers may not be obtained—thus securing the means of forming a Militia Staff competent to organize the Active Force of Militia preparative to, or on the serious apprehension of war, and not wait to organize, *ab initio*, after its declaration, a procrastination that would peril the safety of the Province.

The men so called out should be attested to serve for 14 years, to consist of four years of active and 10 of available service.

During the four years of active service they should be thoroughly instructed, under strict military discipline, receiving the pay and allowances as exhibited in Tables No. 2 and 3. At the end of that period located on contiguous lots of wild lands by battalions, and on the termination of 10 years of available service receiving grants of the lots as a remuneration for faithful service.

During the ten years of available service, should war ensue, they would be available to organise the Sedentary Militia in the vicinity of their settlements.

Three men out of every 100 of the Active Service men of Lower Canada would form 80 companies, each being the regimental staff of 1080, and told

off to counties in the proportion of one company to every thousand in each county. See Table No. 6.

These 80 companies should be incorporated into eight battalions of 10 companies. Four Regiments of Militia Staff should be quartered in Quebec and four in Montreal.

In the event of war the 80 companies could be conveyed from their head-quarters to their counties by railway or steamboat in a few hours, as is made apparent by Table No. 6.

Officers commanding companies of Militia Staff having received nominal rolls from the Adjutant General's Department of their Battalions, and being by law authorized to order all officers and non-commissioned officers of the Sedentary Militia to assist them in collecting their men, I assert, under full conviction of its possibility, that 80,000 men would be incorporated before 48 hours.

Time, ever precious, is inestimable in war, and would be essentially so to us in the event of collision with the United States.

Officers for Militia Staff should be selected out of respectable social positions, of sound health and good education, subject to a strict examination of their military attainments prior to appointment. That should be vested in the Governor General, in the full force and meaning of the words.

Captains of Militia Staff hold the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, senior to all Lieut. Colonels of the Sedentary Militia. Lieutenants that of Captain, on similar terms with reference to Captains of Sedentary Militia.

Captains of Militia Staff, in the event of war, should be appointed Lieut. Colonels, commanding the corps they organize; Lieutenants to Majors; the Sergeants to Regimental Staff Sergeants; the most intelligent half of the Privates to Sergeants, the remainder to Corporals.

Commissioned officers to be retained on permanent full pay.

Non-commissioned officers to be attested for 16 years. This is necessary, as they would be required to organize and discipline the relieving quotas of the Militia Staff that would be incorporated every fourth year for the Active Service period.

Non-commissioned officers and privates, when not receiving pay and drill instruction, to be considered as being on furlough, and report to the Adjutants of Battalions the parish at which they intend to reside, and on reaching it should report themselves to the Colonel of the Sedentary Militia, within 48 hours.

On the termination of a furlough the bearer thereof to report himself at the headquarters of the battalion to which he belongs; failing to do so, he should be subject to such imprisonment, not exceeding one week, as may be decided on by a court martial.

That failing to return should be deemed desertion, and subject the offender to solitary confinement for such term, not exceeding three months, as a court martial may decide.

The foregoing suggestions of penalties are necessary for the times of peace; in the event of war all armed bodies, incorporated for defence of the country, should be brought under the control of the British Mutiny Act, by authority of a clause in our Militia Act.

I now take leave to consider the proposed scheme to call out 50,000 men for instruction for 20 days drill. I presume no less than 2s 6d a day would be paid to each man; this would involve an expenditure of \$250,000 per annum, but the camp equipage, bedding, straw and fuel would increase that sum to a considerable amount. But this large disbursement for pay is very far short of the indirect loss that would be sustained by the Province in its agricultural products, which, added to the amount of pay, I compute at \$1,055,000. See Table No. 5.

I do not submit the foregoing calculations of Table No. 5 as based on data intrinsically correct, but probably they are sufficiently so to show how great the expense such militia drill would entail on the Province.

Contrast this with a system of a Militia Staff that only requires an advance of monies that would be refunded in 41 years, with the great advantage of leaving the rural population, the source of all wealth, to its uninterrupted occupation, as it would require but one parade in the year of the Active Service men to correct the muster rolls of that portion of the Militia for the information of the Adjutant General's Department.

The 80 companies would form the efficient Regimental Staff of 80 Battalions, or say 80,000 men; that in the event of war they would incorporate and drill to a respectable state of efficiency in six weeks; that the 1,560,000 acres granted to the 32 Battalions of Militia Staff for Lower Canada during the first 16 years would, at the termination of 41 years, reimburse the Province for the expenditure necessary to sustain that force, leaving a balance in favor of the Province of \$2,957,090 14. Interest on that sum at six per cent. is \$177,425 40. The annual rent after the 41 years derived from 1,560,000 acres would be \$312,000, and the Ordnance lands, valued at \$3,000,000, at 6 per cent, is \$240,000, making in all an annual income for the Militia of Lower Canada of \$729,125 40, so that the Militia by this system could be rendered self-sustaining to an extent commensurate with our presumed increase of population. See Table No. 4.

It has been objected that the prospect of refunding is too remote to meet with favorable reception. If so let us look ahead and view the result of the present system at the end of 41 years, as per Table No. 4. We will have expended \$16,184,545, and no military security for the money.

I will here add that, in common with other military men, I entertain the opinion that men drilled by a sufficient number of competent instruct-

ors, under strict military command, during six weeks prior to being brought into action. would be more efficient and reliable than men instructed in the loose manner that must of necessity prevail in a Militia camp of instruction, say nothing of the immorality that would be the inevitable result among the youths of the Province by camp life, without the restraint of that salutary discipline enforced in regular armies, that cannot be brought to bear on militia bodies in time of peace.

The reader will bear in mind that at the end of four years of active service, each Battalion of Militia Staff would be rewarded by a grant of 100 acres per man, to be conferred on them by patent of perpetual tenure at the end of their 10 years of available service. Located on contiguous farms, and in the event of war prior to the termination of their service, being all subject by the oath of attestation to military control, each Battalion would be an admirable nucleus for the Sedentary Militia, rendering that force more formidable to an enemy than if left to itself without leaders or instructors; and if peace prevailed they would cultivate their farms during that period under the great advantage of the friendly control of intelligent men, on military principles of order and integrity that would secure unity of action and reciprocal aid, leading to prosperity and happiness, the inevitable result of cheerful and well-directed labor, thus obtaining advantages widely different from that which the isolated backwoods man has ever yet enjoyed.

I believe the proposed grant of land and settlements of Militiamen has been objected to as most probably ending in failure; but when it is remembered that the men would be volunteers, or balloted for by law, and attested for 14 years, they would at the end of that period be placed in so improved a condition that it is not reasonable to assume intelligent beings would for a moment hesitate to retain their homes on the terms I have suggested, that are more favorable than any other terms that men of their rural position could obtain if left to their individual exertions.

The Militia tenure of land before referred to will be for the consideration of 1s per acre per annum, to commence at the expiration of the 10 years of available service; in other words, granted free of rent for ten years. Now, by reference to Account No. 4, that assumes that during 16 years four quotas of Militia Staff for Lower Canada, each to consist of 3,440 men, shall have been called out, i.e., every fourth year, in 16 years 13,760 well trained men will have been added to the ranks of our defenders, the same Table, No. 4, exhibits that the land-rent from these Militiamen, with the Ordnance lands, would in 41 years render the Militia of the country self-sustaining.

When the *Trent* affair burst on us, what enthusiastic and loyal devotion we evinced by the liege subjects of Her Most Gracious Majesty, of every clime and creed throughout the Province—but how were we prepared to

give effect to this noble feeling? Had we arms, accoutrements, ammunition, clothing, camp equipage, medical staff and field-hospital equipments, and the yet more necessary efficient regimental staff of officers and non-commissioned officers to organize and drill the 300,000 Active Service men of Canada? And if deficient of all these elements of national defence, how could we have successfully resisted the aggression of so formidable an army as the Americans would have assailed us with if the untoward event of the *Trent* had been productive of a war with England?

Having escaped this, is it not prudent to weigh the possibility of a war with the now great military Republic, and anticipating the probability of such an event, adopt the most efficient measures to develop our means of resistance? Have we progressed in this direction as far as we could? I think not, and I believe every military man of experience will agree with me that the Province is not prepared to effectually resist a large and well-appointed force, and that the only means of being so, in the absence of a regular army which we cannot sustain, is the formation on a permanent footing of a well-organized Militia Staff, that would secure the incorporation of our three hundred thousand defenders more rapidly and more effectually than any other method that can be proposed, and which obtained in England for some years after the peace of 1815, when the corps of militia were disbanded but the full regimental staff of each battalion was retained on full pay. And if in England in 1815, with a sea between her and the continent, and her ever-victorious fleets guarding her coast, it was deemed prudent to retain in the service the full regimental staff of every Militia regiment of the kingdom, on the remote possibility of a renewal of the war in Europe, how much more necessary must it be for us to organize a Militia Staff at this critical phases of the American Government, with nothing but an imaginary line between us? So important in my humble opinion is the adoption of this measure to England, as being necessary to sustain the integrity of her Empire, that if our finances are for the present inadequate to meet the expenditure consequent on the incorporation of a full and efficient Militia Staff, I hope I will not be considered presumptuous if I express my belief that if a measure of this character were properly submitted to the British Government, we would obtain the necessary pecuniary aid, until the improved condition of our exchequer would enable us to provide for the expenditure, to the sustaining of a force that would, in the event of war between England and the United States, add to the power of Great Britain 300,000 as good soldiers as ever pulled trigger in defence of Her Majesty's Empire.

I now propose to give my reasons for believing in the safe and practical result of a Militia Staff as a preliminary measure to war, for the rapid and efficient organization of 500,000 Active Service men of the Militia of British America that must be incorporated into Battalions, for active service in the

event of war, if its Provinces are to remain an integral part of the greatest Empire the world has yet produced.

Companies of Militia Staff, as provided for by this plan, and being thoroughly instructed to the standard required of all ranks in the regular army, would be up to their work as the Regimental Staff of Battalions, as far as their numbers would permit. The limits of men and time for drill in this sketch (as stated in Tables No. 2 and 3), is a matter of necessity, not of choice; and when adequate means are placed at the disposal of the Minister for Militia Affairs, he could augment the force of Militia Staff from 4 to 8 in a 100, the 8 per cent. being the due proportion to secure efficiency and increase the period of drill to all the year round, as the best means to secure an approximation to perfection, the great essential to military pre-eminence, without which victory is a phantom followed but not obtained.

As I am writing for the information of those who may not be conversant with military matters, I will state that every Regiment of Infantry, say of 800 rank and file, require 121 officers and non-commissioned officers of all ranks to sustain that perfect discipline so conspicuous throughout the ranks of the British Army. Now, if this be necessary to sustain order and enforce obedience in corps thoroughly established, how much more so must it be to the organization of raw levies? And where are you to obtain the Regimental Staff to incorporate and drill the 300,000 Active Service men for Canada, as established by the very last census, if in peace you do not organize a Militia Staff for war, which in Lower Canada is more necessary than in Upper, for as the men must be taken from the rural population, how are they to be instructed unless in their vernacular tongue? We have seen too much of the absurdity of sending Sergeants not knowing one word of French to drill our French Canadian lads.

If the unwelcome tidings of war were announced what a panic would seize the public, what confusion and helplessness would be found in the Department for Militia Affairs, not from want of ability in the Responsible Minister, but from the nullity of the Militia Act. That honorable gentleman would have to appoint 7,962 officers of all ranks to take charge of 300,000 Militiamen, officers and men all ignorant of the important duty suddenly thrust on them; and whilst the appointments are being made and told off to their respective commands, much precious time is wasted, no progress is made in the organization of 300,000 Active Service men, and when the 300 Battalions are incorporated, where are you to obtain 24,000 non-commissioned officers for the drill instruction of these inexperienced officers and men, if you have not previously arranged to secure so indispensable a power to the organization of the masses—and will it not be too late when the enemy is thundering with his cannon at your gates?

If the number of our Active Service men were limited to a few Battalions it would be an easy matter to obtain drill-instructors from the regular

service, as was done in the war of 1812; but now that our ranks of defenders contain 300,000 men for Canada alone, the necessity of a perfectly well-disciplined Militia Staff, to give vitality to our national phalanx, is a manifest necessity—for every man of the Active Service Militia must be incorporated into armies if we wish to avoid being coerced into forming part of the North American Republic; for I apprehend the third invasion of Canada by that power will be on a scale of numbers and efficiency calling for a ready demonstration of a powerful and determined front on our part. We are not prepared for such an exhibition, but let us see what a good Militia Staff would do for us. If the reader will refer to Table No. 6, he will find that 40 companies of the Lower Canada Militia Staff are stationed in Montreal and 40 at Quebec; that the companies are told off to counties, in the proportion as near as possible of one company to 1000 men; that the distance from Montreal and Quebec to the several counties to which the 80 companies are told off will be by steamboat and railway, all within a few hours of their respective appointed localities. The reader will also bear in mind that the Captains of companies are, or would be by the present Act of Militia, in possession of a nominal roll of the men composing their Battalions, and the officers and non-commissioned officers of the Sedentary Militia should be by law bound to assist them in collecting their men. Now, with this system is it too much to say that 80,000 men could be mustered, clothed, accoutered and armed in one week? Will any one say that this is not a rapid incorporation of our Active Service men—80,000 men in a week for Lower Canada—or that it is unnecessary?

It will be perceived that I have confined myself to Lower Canada as an example of a principle which, if extended to its full scope through the breadth of the Provinces of British America, would organize 500,000 men with the same rapidity and efficiency as had been evinced for 80,000 men in Lower Canada. From this point of view it follows that one Militia Act for all the Provinces of British America is indispensable to consolidate England's power in this hemisphere. And to complete our system of defence we require all that is necessary of arms, ammunition and equipments for 500,000 men, to be deposited in store at safe and central points in Canada, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick.

We would also require some British infantry, cavalry and artillery, not on account of numbers, but for the moral support their presence would confer on our brave but inexperienced defenders.

A good force of British field artillery and cavalry would be most valuable, for when opposed to armies of the highest character they are most formidable, and would be still more so to a new army, wanting experienced officers and steady infantry under fire, qualities that long wars only can generate, and to which point of steadiness the American army has not yet attained.

The most striking necessity for a full and efficient Militia Staff is the proximity of the bases that an invading army from the United States would occupy with reference to our most important positions, that necessitates a rapid organization of our full force. That cannot be accomplished by any other means than by a thoroughly well-trained Staff of Militia, the 80 companies of which being the well-instructed Regimental Staff of as many Battalions would, I repeat again, muster, clothe, arm and accoutre for companies, and incorporate Battalions to the extent of 80,000 men, and in six weeks train them to a more efficient degree than any American army that we may have to repel. But without this organization of our population *en masse* it appears to me inevitable that the fate of the Province will be decided by conquest before our 500,000 Active Service men could be brought into the field.

If I were writing for the information of military men this imperfect exposition of my views would be easily understood, and many of the profession have expressed their approbation of them; but as I desire to make myself understood by those whose calling has given them little or no opportunity of being conversant in matters so foreign to their daily occupations, I take leave to recapitulate the leading features of my humble suggestions.

I have given my reasons for apprehending a war between England and the United States, and have proposed a system of Militia that only requires an advance of means to organize, to be refunded in 41 years, leaving a very heavy balance in favor of the Province, with a large annual income for the Militia service.

I have pointed out the great necessity of a rapid and efficient organization of the Active Service men.

I have stated that by this scheme in 16 years 13,760 well-trained men will, in the event of war, form part of the Sedentary Militia, augmenting its efficiency.

I have drawn attention to the proximity of the bases an American army would occupy, with reference to our most important positions.

I will now add there is nothing new in the idea of Militia Staff, no room to doubt the value of the system that England has sustained for years with the most happy results. The Militia men of England were drafted into the line during the Spanish war; good soldiers, wanting but *le baptême du feu* to consummate their honorable calling, which they did honor to in many a hard-fought field.

13,760 Militiamen, settled on 1,560,000 acres of wild lands, would by their improved condition be enabled to add wealth to our Treasury, by their ability to consume rateable goods; a new home-field of industry will be opened to the youth of the country, and arrest an emigration to the United

States that has added power to the Republic and weakened British America by 249,970 souls. More than half that number are most probably from Canada.

Having to the best of my very poor abilities jotted down my thoughts as they suggested themselves, without method or order, I now respectfully submit them to the consideration of my countrymen as the only means, in my opinion, by which we can defend our homes and institutions—after 20 years' service in the British army, that includes the campaigns of 1812, '13 and '14, and 30 years of employment in the Canadian Militia, I hope they will be considered sound and worthy of some attention.

MILES EMERITUS.

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 1812, '13
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(TABLE NO 1.)—AMOUNT OF LAND REQUIRED FOR FOUR QUOTAS OF MILITIA STAFF.

Quota.	Number.	Number of Acres to each rank.	Total number of acres for one battalion of Militia Staff.	
Quota. 1	80 Captain	500	4000	Non-commissioned officers, 16 years of active service, and privates to be enlisted to serve 14 years, i. e., 4 years of active service and 10 years of available service in the event of war.
	160 Lieutenant	300	4800	
	320 Sergeant	200	6400	
	320 Corporal	150	8400	
	2560 Private	100	25600	
			456000	466000
Quota. 2	320 Sergeants	200	6400	
	320 Corporals	150	4800	
	2560 Privates	100	25600	
			368000	368000
Quota. 3	320 Sergeants	200	6400	
	320 Corporals	150	4800	
	2560 Privates	100	25600	
			36800	368000
Quota. 4	320 Sergeants	200	6400	
	320 Corporals	150	4800	
	2560 Privates	100	25600	
			368000	
			Total number of acres	36800
			conceded in 16 years	155000

HER MILITIA.

TABLE No. 2.

ALLOWANCE FOR WOOD.			
Non-Commissioned Officers, Buglars and Privates.	1 Cord per week for 12 men for 13 weeks.	Rate per Cord.	Amount for one period of Service for 8 Battalions.
3200	3458	15s.	2593 10 0 4
Cost of Wood for the 4 periods of Service of 1st quota.....			
Do do do do	do 2nd, 3rd and 4th quota.....		10374 0 0 4
			£41,496 0 0
ALLOWANCE FOR CANDLES.			
Non-Commissioned Officers, Buglars and Privates.	2 lbs. of Candles per week for 12 men for 13 weeks.	Rate per lb.	Amount for one period of Service for 8 Battalions.
3200	6916	6d.	172 18 0 4
Cost of Candles for the 4 periods of Service of 1st quota.....			
Do do do do	do of 2nd, 3rd and 4th quotas.....		691 12 0 4
			£2766 8 0

ALLOWANCE FOR STRAW.

£2766 8 0

Do do do of 2nd, 3rd and 4th quotas.....

ALLOWANCE FOR STRAW.

Non-Commissioned Officers, Buglars and Privates.	1½ Bundles of Straw per man per month for 3 months.	Rate per hundred. 30s.	Amount for one period of Service for 8 Battalions.
3200	14400	30s.	£216 0 0
Cost of Straw for the 4 periods of Service of 1st quota.....			
Do do do of 2nd, 3rd and 4th quotas.....			864 0 0
			3456 0 0

HER MILITIA.

CLOTHING.

	0 5 0	Being worn only 3 months of each of the 4 years of Active Service, but one issue of these articles of Clothing will be made to each quota to last for the 4 years.
1 Cap.....	1 0 0	
1 Great Coat.....	0 5 0	
1 Waist Coat with Sleeves.....	0 10 0	
1 Pair of Cloth Trowsers.....	0 10 0	
1 Pair of Short Boots.....	£2 10 0	
12,800 at 50s. per man.....	£32,000 0 0	

MEDICAL STAFF.

1 Surgeon for 92 days at 8s. a day.....	£36 16 0 x 4.....	17 4 0 x 8.....	1177 12 0 x 4
			£4710 8 0

TABLE No. 3.—REGIMENTAL PAY.

NUMBER.	RANK.	RATE PER DAY.	NO. OF DAYS.	AMOUNT FOR ONE COMPANY FOR ONE YEAR.		REMARKS.
				211	7	11
1	Captain.....	11s. 7d.	365	237	5	0
2	Lieutenants.....	6s. 6d.	365	10	14	8
1	Colour Sergeant.....	2s. 4d.	92	25	6	0
3	Sergeants.....	1s. 10d.	92	24	10	8
4	Corporals.....	1s. 4d.	92	142	12	0
31	Privates.....	1s.	92	4	19	8
1	Buglar.....	1s. 1d.	92			
Captains of Militia Senior and Lieut-Colonels of Militia Senior to all Lieut.-Colonels of Sedentary Militia; Lieutenants of Militia Senior, Captains of Militia Senior to all Captains of Sedentary Militia, to be promoted to rank of Majors on declaration of War. Privates to Sergeants; Captains, now Colonels, to Commanding Battalion.						
43 of all Ranks				£656	15	11
430 of all Ranks, composing 1 Battalion.....				6567	19	2
3440 of all Ranks, composing 8 Battalions.....				52543	13	4
13,760 men of all ranks organized in 10 years.....				210174	13	4
Total amount of Pay for 1st quota, consisting of 8 Battalions, for 4 years Service.						
Total amount of Pay for 4 quotas, each consisting of 8 Battalions, each serving 4 years, active service, and 10 years of available service, in the event of War.						

Total amount of Pay for one Company for one year.

Total amount of Pay for one Battalion for one year.

Total amount of Pay for 8 Battalions for one year.

Total amount of Pay for 1st quota, consisting of 8 Battalions, for 4 years Service.

Total amount of Pay for 4 quotas, each consisting of 8 Battalions, each serving 4 years, active service, and 10 years of available service, in the event of War.

for 4 years Service.

4

13,760 men of all ranks organized in 16 years.....£840698 13 4

{ Total amount of Pay for 4 quotas, each consisting of 8 Battalions, each serving 4 years, active service, and 10 years of available service, in the event of War.

TABLE

MILITIA STAFF IN ACCOUNT WITH THE PROVINCE

To Regimental Pay of the 4 quotas of Militia Staff for 16 years, as per Statement on the other side of this sheet.....	£840,698 13 4
To Regimental Allowances to the 4 quotas of Militia Staff for 16 years, as per Statement on the other side of this sheet,	
Wood.....	41,496 0 0
Candles.....	2,766 8 0
Straw	3,456 0 0
	47,718 8 0
To Regimental Pay to Medical Staff for 16 years, as per State- ment on the other side of this sheet.....	4,710 8 0
To Regimental Clothing for the 4 quotas of Militia Staff, as per Statement on the other side of this sheet.....	32,000 0 0
	<u>£925,127 9 4</u>
	4
	<u>\$3,700,509 86</u>
Balance in favor of the Province at the end of 41 years.....	\$2,957,090 14
	<u>\$6,657,600 00</u>
With a continual annual rent from 1,560,000 acres of Land at 1s. an acre.....	£78,000 or \$312,000 00
Interest of the above balance of \$2,957,090 14 at 6 per cent.....	177,425 40
\$4,000,000 at 6 per cent for Ordnance Lands	240,000 00
Annual income for Militia purposes at the end of 41 years.....	<u>*\$729,425 40</u>

No. 4.

OF CANADA, FOR A PERIOD OF FORTY-ONE YEARS.

By Rent of 456,000 acres of Land at 1s. per acre per annum, payable by the 1st quota of Militia Staff during 27 years, commencing at the expiration of 14 years Service.....	£615,600 or \$2,462,400
By Rent of 368,000 acres of Land at 1s. per acre per annum, payable by the 2nd quota of Militia Staff during 28 years, commencing at the expiration of 14 years Service	£423,200 or \$1,692,800
By Rent of 368,000 acres of Land at 1s. per acre per annum, payable by the 3rd quota of Militia Staff during 19 years, commencing at the expiration of 14 years Service	£349,600 or \$1,395,400
By Rent of 368,000 acres of Land at 1s. per acre per annum payable by the 4th quota of Militia Staff during 15 years, commencing at the expiration of 14 years Service.....	£276,000 or \$1,104,000
	<u>6,657,600</u>

\$6,657,600

*The interest on the balance of the above account, the 1s. rent per acre, and the value of the Ordnance Lands, sums up as below stated, to..... \$729,425 40

The estimates for the year ending 30th of June, 1865, amount to

\$394,745 for 41 years.
41

394,745
1,573,980

\$16,184,545 amount expended at the

end of 41 years if present system of Militia be continued.

TABLE

AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE OF CANADA EAST FOR THE YEAR 1860,

As per Census of 1860-1.

Agricultural Produce of Lower Canada for the year 1860.	No. of Bushels.	Value per Bushel.	Aggregate amount.	
Wheat.....	2,654,354	1 00	2,654,354	00
Barley	2,281,674	60	1,369,004	40
Rye.....	844,192	50	422,096	00
Peas	2,548,777	80	2,119,021	60
Oats	17,551,296	30	5,265,388	80
Buckwheat.....	1,250,025	50	635,012	56
Potatoes.....	12,770,471	30	3,831,141	30
Turnips	892,454	30	27,730	20
Carrots.....	293,067	30	27,920	10
Mangle Wurtzel	207,256	30	27,920	80
Beans	21,384	50	62,176	00
Hops, lb.....	53,387	40	10,692	80
Maple Sugar, lb.....	9,325,147	5	21,354	35
Wool, lb.....	1,967,388	33	466,257	4
Hay, Tons*.....	689,997		649,238	00
Flax and Hemp.....	957,828	20	5,869,104	60
Indian Corn.....	234,861	50	191,565	50
			167,430	
			25,079,487	99

* Calculated at Canadian load of 1800 lbs at \$8.

The population of Canada West, say 1,500,000, will yield 250,000 labourers for field work; they produce agricultural products equal, as per this Table, to \$63,900,645. This sum, divided among 250,000 labourers, would make the annual proceeds of each man's labour, about equal to \$255, or say 81 cents for the working days of the year. Hence, if you abstract the labour of 25,000 men for 20 days, at 81 cents a day, you have 25,000x81x20.....\$405,060

To this add pay for 250,000 men, at 50 cents per man, and
you have 25,000x50x20..... 250,000

655,060

AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE OF CANADA WEST FOR THE YEAR 1860.

Agricultural Produce of Upper Canada for the year 1860.	No. of Bushels.	Value per Bushel.	Aggregate Amount.
Wheat.....	24,620,425	1 00	24,620,425 00
Barley	2,821,962	60	1,693,177 20
Rye.....	973,181	50	486,590 50
Peas.....	9,601,396	80	7,681,115 80
Buckwheat.....	1,248,637	50	624,318 50
Botatoes.....	15,325,920	30	4,597,776 00
Oats	21,220,874	30	6,366,262 20
Turnips	18,205,959	30	5,462,087 70
Carrots	1,995,598	30	571,679 40
Mangle Wurtzel.....	546,971	30	164,091 30
Beans	49,143	50	24,571 50
Hops, lbs.....	247,052	40	98,820 80
Maple Sugar, lbs.....	6,970,605	5	348,530 25
Wool, lbs.....	3,659,766	33	1,207,722 78
Hay, tons.....	861,864	8	3,580,144 00
Flax and Hemp	1,225,934	20	245,186 80
Indian Corn.....	2,56,290	50	1,28,145 00
			63,900,647 73

On the same data for Canada East, at an approximate value, you have say 25,000 men at 30 cents a day for 20 days, or abstraction of field labor, and 25,000 men at 50 cents a day for 20 days pay, hence you have for Lower Canada, 25,000x30x20.....150,000 00

	400,000 00
To this add for Canada West.....	655,000 00

Total..... 1,055,000 00

Much too large a sum, without any advantage to our Agricultural interest, and no security in the event of war with the U. S.

TABLE

TABLE exhibiting the number of Active Service Men in certain Counties organization in the event of war. The distance to which Militia respective Corps, and by what conveyance and time taken to reach

Companies told off from, to, by numbers, and to what Division.	No of Companies.	Counties to which Companies are told off.	No. of Active Service men in each County.	Aggregate No. of the Service men in the Division.	No. of miles from Head Quarters of District.	Conveyance.	Hours & minutes,
{ From 1 to 5 to the 1st Division, 1st District. }	5	Vaudrieul Verchere, Mississquoi.	{ 1490 1628 1957 }	5025	22 30 34	R.R. R.R. R.R.	1 00 1 39 1 34
{ From 6 to 12 to the 2d Division, 1st District. }	7	Rouville, St. Hyacinthe, Richillieu, Yamaska,	{ 1743 1867 2161 1636 }	7407	30 40 50 60	R.R. R.R. R.R. R.R.	1 30 2 00 2 15 3 00
{ From 13 to 17 in the 3d Division, 1st District. }	5	Chambly, Beauharnais, Huntingdon.	{ 1626 1822 2070 }	5518	15 25 45	R.R. S.B. S.B.	45 5 00 8 00
{ From 18 to 21 to 4th Division, 1st District. }	4	Ottawa,	{ 4486 }	4486	103	S.B.	12 00
{ From 22 to 40 to 5th Division, 1st District. }	19	Two Mountains, Terrebonne, Hochelaga, B. City of Montreal, Berthier, H. St. Maurice.	{ 1905 1965 1996 10909 1580 1072 }	19427	34 34 33 60 90	S.B. march march H.Q. S.B. S.B.	7 00 44 00 40 00 12 00 18 00

40 Companies of Militia Staff, to organize.....41,883 Active Service men of the 1st Militia District of Lower Canada, Head Quarters Montreal.

The Companies told off from Montreal and Quebec, the Head Quarters of the 1st and Militia District, would bear the number on their arms, accoutrements and appointments of their respective corps, that is of the Regiments they would have to organize, in the event of war, as Infantry, Rifles, Artillery or Cavalry.

N. B. The letters in the column of conveyance, R.R. Rail Road, S.B. Steam Boat.

No. 6.

of Lower Canada, the number of Companies required for their efficient Staff Companies would have to be detached for the incorporation of their their several divisions.

Companies told off and to what Division.	No. of Companies.	Counties to which Compa- nies are told off.	No. of Active Ser- vice men in each County.	Aggregate No. of service men in the Division.	No. of miles from Head Quarters of District.	Conveyance	Hours & Minutes.
From 41 to 47. 1st Division, 2nd District.	7	{ Dorchester, Bellechasse, L'Islet, Kamouraska.	1759 1792 1339 2289	7179	30 40 60 85	R.R. R.R. R.R. R.R.	1 30 2 00 3 00 4 05
From 48 to 54 2 Division 2 Dis- trict.	7	{ Lotbinière, Megantic, Nicolet.	2505 2511 2023	7039	40 60 70	R.R. R.R. S.B.	2 00 3 00 3 30
From 55 to 59, 3 Division 2 Dis- trict.	5	{ Drummondville, Shefford, Stanstead, Sherbrooke City.	1428 1865 1519 720	5591	75 120 130 85	R.R. R.R. R.R. R.R.	3 35 10 00 13 00 4 05
From 60 to 63, 4th Division, 2 District.	4	{ Rimouski, Bonaventure, Gaspé	2215 1718 1686	4619	150 380 390	S.B. S.B. S.B.	30 00 76 00 72 00
64 to 65, 2 Divi- sion, 2 District.	1	{ Saguenay.	1634	1634	120	S.B.	24 00
From 65 to 80, 6 Division, 2 Dis- trict.	16	{ Montmorenci. City of Quebec, County of Quebec, Portneuf, Champlain.	1704 6015 3325 2183 2910	16137	45 Head Quarte 16 40 60	S.B. ers. march S.B. S.B.	9 00 12 00 8 00 12 00

40 Companies to organize.....42199 of the 2nd Militia
District of Lower Canada, Head Quarters Quebec.